The United Nations Association – Edinburgh , One Day Conference on NATO’s New Strategic Concept and Global Zero was held on 1st of November 2010 at the Scottish Parliament. It was a very enlightening day in many regards, sometimes not in the way that the speakers meant however.
After the introduction by Dr. Gari Donn, first speaker of the day was Lord David Hannay; chair of the United Nations Association and former ambassador to the UN. His broad scope were the challenges, past and present facing NATO. In terms of current nuclear threats, Hannay
focused upon North Korea and Iran. It was clear from a paper provided with the conference papers that Iran has been doing their best to derail the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty review conference held this year so there is something in what he says. In response to my later suggestion, that when it comes to nuclear-armed countries that are not signatories: India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, should not the regional aspects be considered and their own and their rivals security concerns be taken into account? Lord Hannay decided to talk exclusively about Iran and North Korea in this context. He would not even mention the state of Israel by name and assured the meeting that the only nuclear security concern that Iran had was the USA. A quite remarkable statement.
Lord Hannay did offer a nine step programme to forward multi-lateral disarmament however. In brief they were:
Going back to Iran for a moment, it is my view that when it comes to the Middle East, Israel’s nuclear capacity is the elephant in the room. Naturally I do not in any way support the proliferation of nuclear weapons or Iranian attempts to further their capacity in this area. If one applies the logic of the Cold War though, it could be said that Israel and Iran are regional superpowers and rivals. If one side has nuclear weapons, it would be reasonable for the other to attempt to gain a similar capacity in order to bring about a status of MAD – mutually assured destruction. The fact that one side has nuclear weapons will only drive other nations to attempt to develop their own.
Now I am not going to provide a précis of every speaker as that really is the role of the UNA reportage. Another highlight for me though was the Russian delegation led by Vadim Mitrofanov, head of Foreign Policy at the Embassy of the Russian Federation. He expressed Russian disappointment that NATO was not disbanded at the same time as the Warsaw Pact but, perhaps more pertinently, Russia’s commitment to further disarmament talks with the USA and working in partnership with NATO. On the matter of the sub-strategic nuclear capacity, Mr Mitrofanov said that talks had not started yet but they simply could not decide this matter bilaterally with the USA. The reason for this is clear. In Europe the US has stationed 200 B-61 free-fall nuclear bombs, deployed by US and other NATO (German, Dutch, Belgium, Spain, Italy and Turkish) air forces under burden-sharing agreements. (In military terms nuclear gravity weapons are obsolete although fair to say the use of a single bomb would spoil a lot of peoples’ day.) There were various numbers given for Russian capability but the minimum cited was 2000 short and medium-range nuclear weapons. I took the liberty of following up this Russian position in a round-table session and the Russian Consul General Sergey Krutikov was pleased to clarify the position. Russia desires to see a nuclear-free Europe. Therefore in order to achieve that, not only would the Russian and American weapons would have to go but also those of Britain and France.
On Russia in broader terms, it certainly felt like it is NATO 28 + 1. It is clear that a lot of effort is being put into bringing Russia into the fold, if not as full members but certainly as “super-partners” as the new American terminology has it. This concept was unfurled to us by Dana (pronounced “Daina”) M. Linnet of the US Consulate. She did have a lot of good things to say; on how the USA is working to increase transparency in nuclear issues, are working hard to broaden the concepts of deterrents away from being just nuclear-based and enlarging shared risks and commitments. Along with former defence secretary Lord Des Browne, other nations were berated for not working harder with President Obama in order to further these and other worthy ends. One has to say the effect was rather spoiled by one impertinent fellow sticking up his hand at question time and asking of Dana “What would President Palin do?” It led to some back-tracking and statements such as (from Browne) “even those Republicans who think would back this issue” but the point was well made. After Bush’s dismantling of international agreements in 2005 and the Senate’s unwillingness to ratify the test-ban treaty in front of them, the general intransigent nature of US politics is an international problem. In that respect both Linnet and Browne are correct: Obama does offer a window of opportunity.
The day was very useful in terms of answering the question raised on these pages as who actually controls Britain’s nuclear deterrent. Rebekah Grenowski reported she was summarily put down by Rebecca Johnson of ACRONYM when the former raised this issue. Johnson assured Rebekah that the ownership of Trident was the subject of a bilateral UK-US agreement. This statement is backed up by the response to our letter to Nick Harvey. However, the issue of NATO strategic control was not contradicted by others in round-table meetings. It seems to me therefore that it is not a question of which is right or wrong, rather there is a double-lock on nuclear deployment. Bilateral agreements with the USA backed up with NATO unanimity – which also involves the USA. I feel this matter requires further clarification. It is probably the case though that in reality UK defence spending is bound totally to NATO commitments, thus casting light upon Hillary Clinton's recent intervention on the UK's Strategic Defence and Security review.
I only touched upon some of the matters raised on the day. When the UNA put up their full report I will post the link. It was a very worthwhile day and I am grateful for the chance to attend but sometimes the truth of any matter is deliberately obscure and the more I learn about nuclear weapons, the greater I have that feeling.
Permalink Reply by Rebekah Gronowski on November 10, 2010 at 21:25
Permalink Reply by Rebekah Gronowski on November 11, 2010 at 7:34
Permalink Reply by Martin Veart on November 15, 2010 at 21:24 We have received the Report this morning and I am sure Martin will put up a link to it.
Permalink Reply by Martin Veart on December 30, 2010 at 5:14
Permalink Reply by Rebekah Gronowski on December 31, 2010 at 8:59 It might be helpful to have the actual text of the Treaty, so I am posting it here with the link to the relevant website.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons ( NPT )
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to
take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon
States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear
disarmament,
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
Article V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate
international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.
Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Article VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Article VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Article VIII
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the
instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the
convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
Article IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
Article XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments.
Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:
On 11 May 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely (see decision 3).
Copyright 2000, Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, Edinburgh Branch
We acknowledge the Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, Edinburgh Branch which holds this Copyright.
The EUNA website is here - http://www.edinburghuna.co.uk/28.html
Permalink Reply by Rebekah Gronowski on December 31, 2010 at 9:26 What is more worrying about the item posted by Martin is the letter from the MOD which accompanied it. As it is not yet in the public domain it cannot be reproduced in full, but I think it is importasnt to appraise you of this fact -
"NATO, as an Alliance, is not able to be a member of the UN and a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, the nuclear weapons which are assigned to NATO are all owned by nations who are recognised as being nuclear weapons states under the NPT and all NATO members are signatories to the NPT. For the first time, NATO had a representative from its International Staff as an official observer at the MAY 2010 Review Conference.
The Strategic Concept commits the Alliance to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance."
Whilst each country has nuclear weapons on its territory, it cannot divest itself of those weapons with out the consent of all the other members of NATO because NATO has declared itself to be a Nuclear Alliance.
I am still of the opinion that the real role of NATO needs to be re-visited and re-appraised, especially as it does not just represent countries in and around the Atlantic - it is taking "all-comers" which, in my view, makes a nonsense of NATO itself.
We, as a nation, are bound by its rules - do we still wish to remain so?