International law and disarmament - discussion

As far as I can see, nuclear weapons, their ownership and ultimate use stand apart from almost every other issue covered by international law; they are often referred to as an 'ultimate insurance policy' of a nation's sovereignty, and the last line of defence against a nuclear- (or other WMD-) armed aggressor state. They carry a weight of fear of destruction on an inhuman scale unmatched by any other weapon, which is, of course, their purpose.

In this context, it seems unlikely that a ruling in a court of international law would be of much significance as to the current or aspirant ownership of nuclear arms, and certainly not to their usage. All declared nuclear powers describe their arsenals as deterrents, not first-strike weapons, and so their usage is something of an oddity in any case (since they have failed in their purpose if you come to use them). If it were deemed illegal to use a nuclear weapon, I would suggest that no nuclear-armed country in the world would hesitate to use them should the existing conditions for their use be met; to suggest otherwise would effectively write-off your deterrent and invite an attack by a less scrupulous aggressor.

As to ownership of weapons - a judgement that it is illegal to own nuclear arms would make no difference to short-term disarmament (since several states are ostensibly committed to phased multilateral disarmament to minimum credible levels), and no difference to long-term disarmament either since all states will want assurances from others in the same way they already do. I would suggest that the likely scenario for the foreseeable future is that no state that currently owns nuclear arms will unilaterally give them up, regardless of what the lawyers say. Aspirant states can then accuse declared states of hypocrisy and carry on regardless (as is happening in Iran).

Nuclear disarmament, if and when it happens, will not come from the courtroom - governments obey international law and treaties because it is in their interest to do so; in the face of annihilation there is no such motivation. There will be no quick-fix to disarmament, there will be no magic bullet; any solution that causes instability is dangerous, and and solution that leaves aspirant states unchallenged is dangerous - international law has a role to play in anti-proliferation, but it will not force disarmament and it will not disconnect the button in the submarine.

The large sums of money, time and resources invested in the frivolous exploration of the extremes of international law that we see are indicative of the lack of objectivity that plagues nearly every international institution - many conflicts and the enormous unsolved problems of global poverty, climate change and resource exploitation are a direct result of this.

Replies to This Discussion

Permalink Reply by Rebekah Gronowski on March 16, 2012 at 13:21

The link I have put on the main page works - there is no need to buy a copy at all. It is a .pdf download.

http://www.leftfootforward.org/2012/03/centreforum-dropping-the-bom...

Fron the same web page there is a link to the .pdf "The 2010 Defence Review" -

Quote - "This is absurd. Trident’s raison d’etre was removed when the Soviet Union collapsed two decades ago. The 2010 defence review (pdf) clearly states the UK does not face invasion. Nor is there a “Cold War” nuclear threat from Russia or China...."

Permalink Reply by Matt Hill on March 17, 2012 at 22:32

I've read the recommendations and am digging through the body of the document now. To its credit it has a well-researched history and makes its points clearly and rationally, although it does seem to miss a few (what I would consider obvious) points and make a few odd suggestions; I concede if they're covered in more detail in the main body of the text I may not have gotten to them yet.

The author suggests converting the Vanguard subs to cruise missile boats, but at the same time retaining the capability to field Trident within 12 months - I'm not sure who his source in the Navy was, but I'm pretty certain that's impossible. Maybe some tubes could be left Trident-capable (i.e. a dual-use boat) but that would go against his 'cold storage' argument that we would have no deployed nuclear capability. No-one would believe us that there were none on board, basically, and even if we did convert the boats that would remain an issue. The contention that we could rapidly develop an air-dropped weapon is flawed for two reasons: first, such a weapon would have little to no practical deterrent value (as the author also states in the report) against an opponent with competent air defences, which all nuclear-armed states do have. Secondly, keeping Trident in storage and developing a second deterrent platform would violate our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; we can only have one or the other, unless we join the ranks of North Korea and withdraw, of course.

Additionally, he recommends us keeping the Polaris (now Trident) Sales Agreement in place without actually fielding any of the missiles - while this would certainly take care of the thorny issue of withdrawing from an ongoing partnership with the US, it seems highly unlikely that Parliament would be able to sell the idea of such expenditure for no tangible 'product' to the public. There is also the issue that the US may not be interested in keeping up what is already a pretty one-sided deal if we were to then go to them and say "Oh, by the way, you're now expected to act as our nuclear shield as well as the rest of the world - but here's a few million to sweeten the deal". I think that's a pretty tall order for even the most talented diplomat.

The point that nuclear weapons are a 'prestige' item is not novel, nor is it without at least an element of truth; the UK punches above its weight diplomatically for many reasons (humanitarian aid work, contribution to international bodies, contribution to international research, peacekeeping duties...) and to imply that all of that counts for nothing compared to our deterrent is, frankly, patronising and insulting. The UK does not threaten people with its deterrent (as the author himself points out) for political gain, nor does it roll Vanguard-class submarines around as a form of gunboat diplomacy. The UK has a lot to be proud of in its international work - and, arguably, a lot to answer for from previous conflicts - but the deterrent is not the be all and end off of Britain's contribution to the world.

Finally, there is a general tone that essentially all of the UK's nuclear deterrent infrastructure be maintained (including such as necessary to field Trident-armed SSBN's). In the same breath, he talks about 80% reductions in spend on Trident to fund the Future Force 2020 project (the UK's identified future conventional forces requirements). This disparity seems quite peculiar, to say the least, and I have yet to find the section where he justifies the difference in costs between essentially having everything in place to get Trident going again quickly (and another weapon system, presumably concurrently, for that matter) and just actually having it in service.

Those are my initial observations, at any rate!

Permalink Reply by Matt Hill on March 27, 2012 at 20:32

Any initial thoughts upon reading the document, anyone?

Permalink Reply by Janet King on April 14, 2012 at 20:07

I have had time to think about the implications of Toby Fenwick's suggestions ( Dropping the Bomb;a post Trident Future pub Centre Forum) and I agree with them only partially.The first four recommendations I can live with;

1 Retire the existing Trident.system immediately without replacement and use the current submarines for a conventional role.. Why not? NB The US Navy has done this with its Ohio class subs.

2Retain our NATO commitment of 2% of GDP expenditure on defence but spend this on conventional weapons and staff.(I wish it were less and that those who object to funding the military could be allowed to specify how that part of their taxes could be spent - the Peace Tax 7 - this is difficult however and the 7 were not able to take their case to the EU).

3 Retain the UK's ability to design and build nuclear powered (as opposed to nuclear armed) submarines if we wish to retain a global military presence.

4 Build a verification capability at AWE with VERTIC to use when global nuclear disarmament is achieved. Its presence would be a powerful force in convincing other nuclear states that world disarmament is possibke to police.and would, of course, employ scientists at AWE.

The next set of recommendations.including the suggestion that the UK moves to a nuclear threshold position (nuclear weapons not on alert but in cold storage with a 12 month time scale until ready for action) are less accepyable.

5 Renew the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement until 2024. Why?? I suggest that we should be moving towards a European Defence Force (non-nuclear) and away from our present over-reliance on the US, which had led us into two Middle Eastern wars (at crippling cost) and appears to be revving up for a trip to yet another adventure in that region. Enough is enough.Why not trust the EU rather than the US as an ally?

6 Retain the Trident Sales Agreement with the US.Why?

7Retain the UK's existing stocks of weapons grade Uranium and Plutonium (75 yrs worth -and our petrol stocks are so low we panic when there is a `strike' threatened).This is hypocritical when we are demanding that other countries do not have a stock of these fuels and why do we need so much if any?

8 Retain the capability to deploy a nuclear weapon (as at present) in a 12 months time span. The nuclear threshold is better than the present CASD and capability but not good enough for me. However it might convince other countries that nuclear disarmament is posible and would be a worthwhile gesture.

Your thoughts,please.Or have you already had this conversation elsewhere, Martin and Matt? Let me know which discussion link you are using if so.

Permalink Reply by Matt Hill on April 14, 2012 at 20:59

My thoughts are above - the document contains some interesting ideas but doesn't really hang together for me.

Permalink Reply by Janet King on April 15, 2012 at 9:07

Yes, Matt, I have read your comments and I think we can agree that we both find the Centre Forum document insufficient but for very different reasons. I think that many of Toby's recommendations are sensible as long as we remember that the UK will never act alone as a nuclear or conventional `defence' force. The world is no longer like that 9was it ever?) so whatever we are involved in it will be alongside other states. I therefore do not despair of Future Force 2020's capacity and I think it would be suffient to contribute to any conflict, which could arise, without a nuclear component.

I just wish some of our readers, who support my stance against Trident replacement, would show their agreement by contributing to this discussion!

Matt Hill said:

My thoughts are above - the document contains some interesting ideas but doesn't really hang together for me.